Atta Intel Search

From: Caso, Russell
Sent: Wednesday, January 18, 2006 12:04 AM
To: curtpa07
Subject: Fw: Post Holiday update/additional notes

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Red


This is the guy we met on that saturday of several weeks ago. He is still working to support our efforts.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

—–Original Message—–
From: Dennis Erickson <>
To: Caso, Russell <>
Sent: Tue Jan 17 11:14:44 2006
Subject: Post Holiday update/additional notes

Mr. Caso;

Wanted to touch base with you to provide you some additional information relating to our earlier discussions that we had prior to the Holiday recess. I have done much thinking concerning the topic as well as further research into what we still possess from that time period in the way of analytic products. To me the 9/11 Commission Report while being a laudatory effort, in my opinion, fell short in a couple of major areas which concerns me. The first is military intelligence and what it had and was doing pre-
9/11 as far as tracking and identifying possible terrorist activity and secondly, the role of information operations pre and post 9-11. You will find little, if any, mention of either in the released document nor the intelligence support functions/methodologies that go along with each. There are certainly problems as well as successes to be noted with each and I would be more than happy to address those in an information paper (from an Army
perspective) as well as offering some solutions. With all of that said, I have found another key personality who was briefed or involved with our operation in the fall of 2001 and that was Gen. Downing. I have also found additional analyst notebook charts that were produced, the most interesting is a copy of the CENTCOM mujahidin network which had been a work in progress since prior to 9-11 and I think was actually begun after the Cole bombing incident in 2000. In conducting some cursory searches through the data, I was able to come up with the following
Atta – 891
Mohammad Atta – 5
Muhammad Atta – 2
Brooklyn – 2
New York – 52
Florida – 2
Seattle – 2
California – 1
Washington – 49

The other analyst notebook charts are:
Mujahidin in Yemen (last accessed 3/19-02) UBL Center of Gravity chart (which we discussed during our last meeting) CENTCOM facilitator network NGO/Al Haramain (last accessed 1/3/02) Zarqawi network (June 01 – Oct 01) Qutaiba (Nov 00 – Oct 01) Terror groups (last accessed 1/11/02) Taliban leadership (last accessed 9/24/01) Al-Barakaat financial network (last accessed 12/20/01)

Important dates for our effort in tracking CT:
– 25 Oct 00 Cole bombing brief to Congress
– 26 Oct 00 CINCENT request to IDC for support
– 26 Dec 00 CJCS, CINCENT, CINCSOC, VCSA, Dir DIA, DCSOPS validate IDC task
– 5 Jan 01 CINCSOC, CJCS, CINCENT re-validate task
– 12 Feb 01: CSA (Gen Shinseki) tell CG INSCOM that CT mission is ‘top priority’
– Jun/Jul 01: begin center of gravity analyst notebook study in support of tasking

You can probably throw in some of the Able Danger dates in amongst my notes that I took during the time. I hope that you all had a happy holiday season which I am sure was a busy one for all. If you get a chance tell the Congressman that I did marry my gal from Pennsylvania on Dec 24th and had the opportunity to spend some time in Pittsburgh over the holidays. I am now a partial Steeler fan convert.
Thanks again,
Dennis Erickson

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